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INTRODUCTION

A lawyer in the American legal system is called upon to perform a
* Associate, Holbrook, Kaufman & Becker, San Antonio, Texas; B.S., Southern Methodist University; J.D., St. Mary's University. This article was originally prepared by the author and Douglas W. Becker as a course outline for the State Bar of Texas 1985 Advanced
Real Estate Law Course. Portions of that outline contained herein are reprinted with permission of the State Bar of Texas.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 4

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:79

variety of functions for his or her client. An attorney may serve as
advisor, advocate, negotiator or as an intermediary. Lawyers engaged
in a real estate practice most often act as advisors and negotiators.
The Preamble to the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct describes a lawyer's responsibility as follows:
As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding
of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical
implications. . . .As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous
to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with
others.'
When an attorney's loyalties are divided, he or she may have difficulty
fully discharging these responsibilities and a conflict of interest may
result. The effect of the conflict depends on its nature and the applicable ethical standards in the jurisdiction. In a real estate practice, ethical conflicts of interest can arise when an attorney enters into an
attorney-client relationship with more than one party in a single
transaction. Ethical conflicts can also arise when a lawyer represents
interests adverse to former or existing clients. In addition, laws and
rules governing lending institutions and title insurers proscribe certain
activities that would give rise to legal conflicts of interest.
Although it may be said that all parties to a real estate transaction
have a common interest in closing the transaction, each party has distinct interests which may or may not be adequately protected if one
lawyer represents more than one party. In the typical real estate
transaction, there may be a seller, buyer, lender(s), title insurer,
trustee, real estate agent(s), mortgage broker(s), tenant(s), lien claimant(s), as well as attorneys for many of the foregoing. If any of the
parties are corporations or partnerships, the interests of the organization and the individual officers, directors, shareholders, partners, or
venturers must also be protected.
A lawyer who undertakes to perform legal services for more than
one of the parties to the transaction, or a lawyer who has a business
interest in some aspect of the transaction, must carefully examine the
potential for a conflict of interest before agreeing to represent the client. If a conflict of interest exists, or it appears that one might arise
during the course of the representation, the lawyer has two options.

1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, PREAMBLE, SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGY

(1984), reprinted in VII MARTINDALE-HuBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VII at 1 (1985 ed.).
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First, representation may be declined altogether, or second, if the lawyer determines that representation of the conflicting interests will not
impair his or her independent professional judgment on behalf of
either client, the attorney may undertake the representation. Simply
believing that there will be no impairment of independent professional
judgment is not sufficient in and of itself. The lawyer must advise and
fully disclose the nature of the conflict to all the parties involved in
the transaction, and each must give his or her informed consent to the
representation. Preferably, such disclosure and consent should be in
writing. If an actual conflict subsequently arises, withdrawal is necessary if the lawyer can no longer exercise independent professional
judgment or if continued representation might jeopardize confidences
and secrets of the client.
This article examines the standards of professional conduct regarding conflicts of interest and suggests means of avoiding conflicts
through disclosure, consent and screening. Additionally, this article
identifies other conflicts of interest in real estate transactions which
arise by operation of law or administrative rule.
II.

STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The three primary sources for standards of professional conduct
are: (1) the individual state Codes of Professional Responsibility,2 (2)
the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code),3 and (3) the ABA Model Rules of Pro2. See

NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(R. Metsky 3d ed. 1985). This four volume series is organized by state. For each state, the
materials are organized in the following manner: (1) state table of contents; (2) state code of
professional responsibility; (3) state bar formal and informal ethics opinions; and (4) full-text
state supreme court and court of appeals cases, as well as applicable federal court decisions.
This series is an excellent source to consult when comparing and contrasting the individual
states' Codes of Professional Responsibility.
3. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) (adopted by the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 12, 1969), reprintedin THE BUREAU
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ 1:301 (1985). The Code is comprised of three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PREAMBLE AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (1980), reprinted in THE BUREAU OF

ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ 1:300 (1985). The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts
from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived. The Ethical
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.,
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fessional'Conduct (Model Rules). 4 The Disciplinary Rules (DR) and
Ethical Considerations (EC) under Canons 4, 5 and 9 of the Model
Code and the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility (Texas
Code), and Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 and 1.13 of the Model Rules are most
applicable to conflicts of interest.5 Although the Model Rules have
been adopted in only a few states, they provide additional guidelines
for evaluating actual or potential conflicts of interest.6 The Model

Rules attempt to more fully address deficiencies which have become
evident with time and practice under the Model Code.7 In addition to
judicial decisions on attorney conflicts of interest in real estate transactions, ethics opinions issued by state and local bar associations are a
Considerations are aspirational and represent the objectives toward which every member of the
profession should strive. The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are
mandatory in nature. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. See id. § 1:300.
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (adopted by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 2, 1983), reprinted in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VII at 1 (1985 ed.).
5. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 4, 5, 9 (1980), reprinted
in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:302 (1985); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.8,
1.9, 1.13 (1983), reprinted in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VII at 8-14
(1985 ed.).
6. As of August 1985, four states, New Jersey, Arizona, Minnesota, and Montana have
adopted the Model Rules. See ABA STATUS REPORT ON CONSIDERATION OF MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (July 4, 1985).
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.13 (1983), reprinted in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VII at 8-14 (1985 ed.). Rule
1.7 provides generally that an attorney shall not represent a party if that party's interests are
directly adverse to an existing client's interests or to the attorney's personal interests. See id. at
8. Rule 1.7 seeks to clarify DR 5-105 (A) by imposing a directly adverse standard for evaluating multiple representation conflicts. See id. at 9 (analyzing changes between Model Code and
Model Rule provisions). Rule 1.8 prohibits an attorney from entering into business or other
transactions with or for a client which could injure the client's interests. See id. at 9-10. Rule
1.8 is a more detailed prohibition on attorney-client transactions than was DR 5-104. See id.
at 10-11 (discussing and comparing Model Rules with Model Code). Rule 1.9 prohibits an
attorney from representing a party whose interests are substantially related to and materially
adverse to a former client's interests. See id. at 11. Rule 1.9 had no counterpart in the Model
Code. See id. at 11. Rule 1.13 sets forth specific ethical requirements for an attorney working
for or representing an organization. See id. at 13. There was no similar provision in the Model
Code. See id. at 14. The drafters of the Model Rules specifically sought to clarify the duties of
an attorney in an attorney-client relationship. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, PREAMBLE, SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGY (1984), reprinted in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VII at 1 (1985 ed.). See generally Comment, Conflicts ofInterest
in Real Estate Transactions: Dual Representation- Lawyers Stretching the Rules, 6 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 73, 74 (1983) (discussing alterations contained in Model Rules and attorneys'
obligations to be familiar with both Model Code and Rules).
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primary source for interpretation of these conflicts of interest
standards.'
A.

Representation of Multiple Clients in a Single Transaction

The most typical conflict of interest in a real estate transaction is
the situation in which an attorney represents more than one party to a

transaction. The general standard of practice in multiple representation situations may be stated as follows: a lawyer may represent multiple parties in a particular matter if: (1) the lawyer believes that such

representation will not adversely affect his or her ability to exercise
independent professional judgment as to the interests of each client;
and (2) if all clients consent to the representation after full disclosure
of the potential conflicts.9 The following cases are examples of multiple representation conflicts in real estate transactions.10
In Dillard v. Broyles,1I a Texas attorney represented both the buyer
and seller in a residential real estate transaction and was named
trustee in the deed of trust securing the buyer's promissory note to the
seller. When the buyer subsequently defaulted on the note, the attor-

ney sent a notice of acceleration and notice of trustee's sale to the
buyer. The property was sold by the trustee. In a suit to set aside the
foreclosure sale, the buyer alleged the attorney was guilty of fraud by

virtue of his dual representation in connection with the initial closing.
8. See THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985). This looseleaf service contains both formal and informal
ethics opinions reprinted in full text. State and local ethics opinions are also contained in
digest form. See id.
9. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (C) (1980), reprinted
in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:301 (1985); see also Hechenberder v. Western Elec. Co., 570 F. Supp.
820, 823 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (lawyer may represent multiple clients if he can adequately represent
each and each consents after full disclosure of conflict); Peaslee v. Pedco, Inc., 388 A.2d 103,
107 (Me. 1978) (lawyer should not undertake representation unless each can be adequately
represented and express consent has been obtained after full disclosure); In re Dolan, 384 A.2d
1076, 1079-80 (N.J. 1982) (multiple representation prohibited unless each client can be adequately represented and each client consents after being adequately informed of the conflict).
But see In re Jans, 666 P.2d 830, 833 (Or. 1983) (never proper for lawyer to represent clients
with conflicting interests even with disclosure and consent). For an overview of the general
ethical considerations of multiple representation, see Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Real
Estate Transactions: DualRepresentation- Lawyers Stretching the Rules, 6 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 73, 75-81 (1983).
10. For a collection of other cases discussing conflicts of interest in real estate transactions, see Annot., 68 A.L.R. 3d 967 (1976).
11. 633 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
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The trial court exonerated the attorney from any improper action. 12
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court, holding that the attorney's representation of both parties
to the transaction was neither improper nor unethical. 3 The court
held that an attorney may represent both the buyer and seller when
the attorney has first disclosed the conflict and then obtained the parties' consent to proceed. 4 The Dillardcourt further determined that
the attorney-client relationship between the attorney and the buyers
had terminated upon the closing of the initial sale; therefore, the attorney breached no ethical duty to the buyer in conducting the
trustee's sale. 5
In Grundmeyer v. McFadin,16 an attorney represented both parties
to an earnest money contract involving approximately 130 acres of
raw land. In a suit for cancellation of the earnest money contract, the
sellers alleged that the attorney's dual representation rendered the
contract invalid and void. The trial court judgment, however, held
that there was no evidence that the attorney ever actually represented
the proposed buyers.17 On appeal the Tyler Court of Civil Appeals
also concluded that the attorney was not representing the sellers;
therefore, conflict of interest could not arise.' 8 The court of appeals
also stated, in that if the attorney had represented both parties to the
transaction, there was no improper conduct because the record
showed that the sellers had knowledge of it and consented to it. 19
San Antonio Bar Association v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co. 20 involved two lawyers who owned and represented a title company and a
mortgage company. The lawyers regularly performed legal services
for the title company, the mortgage company, and purchasers or borrowers in the same real estate transaction. In the typical transaction,
their title company issued title policies. The bar association sought a

12. See id. at 642.
13. See id. at 642-43.
14. See id. at 643 (citing The State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Op. 228 (1959)).
15. See id. at 643.
16. 537 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. See id. at 769.
18. See id. at 772. The court reasoned that an agent, serving two principals, owes the
highest degree of loyalty to both and therefore must disclose any conflict arising from his or
her service to both. See id. at 772.
19: See id. at 773.
20. 291 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1956).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol17/iss1/4

6

Sanford: Ethical, Statutory, and Regulatory Conflicts of Interest in Real

1985]

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN REAL ESTATE

permanent injunction against the attorneys.21 Suit was filed alleging
that the manner in which the businesses were operated by the attorneys constituted conflicts of interest as well as the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation.22 In the normal course of business, when
a contract was brought to the title company by a real estate agent, all
the mortgage instruments for the lender were prepared at the office of
the title company. The sale was closed at the title company and a title
policy was issued. Many times, these transactions occurred with no
participation whatsoever from the attorneys. Documents were prepared by scriveners, and closings were handled by non-lawyer closers.
Neither the scriveners nor the closers were closely supervised by the
attorneys. The trial court granted the injunction enjoining the attorneys from preparing any legal documents in connection with real esin which the title company was to issue a title
tate transactions
23
policy.
The court of civil appeals modified the injunction to permit the attorneys to prepare documents when all the parties to a transaction
requested them to prepare the legal documents necessary to close the
transaction.24 The appellate court reasoned that if all the parties consented to the multiple representation then representation was proper
and the lawyers should not be enjoined. 25 The Supreme Court of
Texas reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirmed
the trial court's judgment, stating that the public interest was better
safeguarded by prohibiting the attorneys from further involvement
through their mortgage company.26 The court stated that to allow
this form of multiple representation based merely on the "request" of
the parties does not meet the full disclosure and informed consent
21. See id. at 698.
22. See id. at 698-99 see also Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Comm. of the State Bar of
Texas, 272 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1955, no writ) (acts of any person
in drawing deeds, notes, mortgages, and releases relating to property rights of others, when
performed for consideration, constitutes practice of law).
23. See San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 291 S.W.2d 697, 700
(Tex. 1956). A licensed real estate broker or licensed sales person may complete form earnest
money agreements normally prepared by an attorney provided they comply with the standards
of care demanded of an attorney. See Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630,
634-35 (Wash. 1985); cf Sherman v. Broton, 497 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas
1973, no writ) (drafting leases by real estate broker constitutes unauthorized practice of law).
24. See San Antonio Bar Assn. v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 291 S.W.2d 697, 700
(Tex. 1956).
25. See id. at 700.
26. See id. at 703.
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requirement necessary to validate such representation.2 7
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Collins,28 a Maryland case involving dual representation of a buyer and seller in connection with
the purchase and sale of a lease and a liquor license, the attorney was
suspended from practice for one year. A disciplinary action was
brought against the attorney, who was also the seller's managing partner, for his failure to advise the buyer that the liquor license being
sold had lapsed, and for his assertion to the buyer that a non-competition agreement with the seller was unnecessary.2 9 The Maryland
Court of Appeals determined that the attorney's conflicting loyalties
had adversely affected his independent professional judgment, thereby
making his representation unethical.3"
A lawyer was reprimanded as a result of his representation of both
the vendor and purchaser of real property in a New Jersey decision,
In re Lanza.3 1 The attorney failed to fully advise the parties of the
areas of potential conflict of interest and, when a conflict subsequently
arose, the attorney failed to withdraw from the representation.3 2 The
Lanza court found three instances of misconduct: (1) undertaking
representation of the buyer without consulting with the seller to explain "in specific detail" all the potential conflicts that might
foreseeably arise; (2) failing to obtain the prior consent of the parties;
and (3) upon learning that the buyer would not be able to pay cash as
provided in the contract, failing to require the execution and delivery
of a mortgage or other security for $1,000 to adequately protect the
seller.33 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in deeming the reprimand

27. See id. at 703.
28. 457 A.2d 1134 (Md. 1983).

29. See id. at 1143-44.
30. See id. at 1145. The court, holding that DR 5-105 (A) and (B) were violated, found
as significant the fact that the attorney was the seller's partner. See id. at 1144-45. Because of
this partnership, the court held that the attorney had a personal "stake" in the sale of the

,license. See id. at 1145.
31. 322 A.2d 445, 447 (N.J. 1974).
32. See id. at 447. The attorney had prepared an earnest money contract providing for a
cash sale. The parties later agreed to move up the closing date, but the buyer told the seller
that he would lack $1,000 of the total purchase price at the earlier date. The buyer suggested

that the seller accept his check for $1,000 postdated for 30 days. The seller was personally
agreeable to this proposal but consulted the attorney who saw no reason not to follow such
course. The sale closed and the seller took the buyer's $1,000 check. The buyer then discovered water damage in the basement of the home and stopped payment on the check. The seller
called the lawyer; the lawyer did nothing on her behalf. See id. at 447.
33. See id. at 447.
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to be proper, stated: "[i]t is ulterly insufficient to simply advise a client that he, the attorney, foresees no conflict of interest and then to
ask the client whether the latter will consent to the multiple representation . . . this is no more than an empty form of words."34
In a Kansas case involving the sale of approximately 320 acres of
land, an attorney who represented both the buyer and seller was indefinitely suspended from practice. 35 The Kansas Supreme Court, in
State v. Callahan, found that the attorney did not exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the seller when he failed to
disclose his business ties with the buyer and by his failure to disclose
to the seller that she had no foreclosable interest in the land if the
buyer later defaulted.3 6
In a Wisconsin case, In re Nelson, 37 an attorney represented both
the buyer and seller in negotiations for the sale of condominium units.
Title opinions regarding the property were also rendered to both clients by the attorney. The attorney was suspended for 60 days for:
(1) failure to disclose his financial interest in the seller corporation,
(2) failure to disclose financial difficulties being experienced by the
seller of which the attorney had knowledge, and (3) deficiencies in the
condominium document.38
34. Id. at 448. The court noted that this case emphasized the problems awaiting attorneys representing both the buyer and seller in a real estate transaction. See id. at 448. The
court pointed out that the New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics has ruled

that it is unethical in all circumstances for the same attorney to represent both the buyer and
seller when negotiating the terms of a contract for sale. See id. at 448 (citing New Jersey
Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, Op. 243, reprinted in 95 N.J.L.J. 1145 (1972)).

35. See State v. Callahan, 652 P.2d 708 (Kan. 1982).
36. See id. at 713. The attorney had prepared a "Real Estate Purchase Contract" which
provided for the purchase price to be paid partly in cash and partly by a note to the seller. A
second contract was signed, entitled "Pledge, Escrow and Agreement," which recited the payment schedule and further provided that upon default and nonpayment of any judgment the

seller would have a "specific lien" subject only to a prior Federal Land Bank mortgage. The
seller believed she was receiving a second mortgage lien when in fact she received only an
unsecured note. When the buyer defaulted, the seller contacted the attorney regarding foreclosure, but was told that foreclosure was not necessary. The seller persisted in requesting that

the lawyer begin foreclosure proceedings. The lawyer ultimately declined citing conflicts of
interest. The seller retained other counsel, who informed her that she had no foreclosable
interest because she had received only an unsecured note. See id. at 710. See generally, Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transactions: Dual Representation - Lawyers
Stretching the Rules, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 73, 93-103 (1983); Roussel, Pera, & Rosenberg,
Bar-Related Title Insurance Companies: An Antitrust Analysis, 24 VILL. L. REV. 639 (1979).
37. 332 N.W.2d 811 (Wisc. 1983).
38. See id. at 811-12. The court held that the attorney's actions were a violation of SCR

20.24 (refusing employment when the interests of the lawyer may impair his or her independ-
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These cases illustrate the types of problems which can arise when
an attorney is subject to conflicting loyalties because of representation
of multiple parties with differing interests. Disciplinary, actions
ranged from reprimands to indefinite suspensions and permanent injunctions. In each case, these sanctions may have been avoided had
the lawyer fully disclosed the specific nature of the conflict of interest
and obtained the clients' informed consent. The following sections
illustrate the rules applicable to multiple representation conflicts in
more specific situations.
1. Lawyer Representing Lender and Borrower

In several jurisdictions, bar associations have opined that an attorney may represent both a mortgage lender and its borrower if the
interests of each client can be adequately represented.3 9 Each client,
however, must consent to the dual representation after full disclosure

ent professional judgment; similar to DR 5-101 (A)); 20.28 (refusing to accept or continue
employment if the interests of another client may impair the independent professional judgment of the lawyer; similar to DR 5-105 (A)); 20.04 (4) (misconduct - engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceipt or misrepresentation; similar to DR 5-105 (B)). See id. at
812; see also WISCONSIN COURT RULES AND PROCEDURE ch. 20 at 563 (West 1984) (Code of
Professional Responsibility).
39. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 81-4 (1981) (interpreting DR 5-105 (C) which allows representation of multiple clients if
attorney can adequately represent client's interest and all clients consent after full disclosure),
summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:6319 (1985); accord Birmingham Bar Ass'n, Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 3 (1981) (interpreting DR 5-105 (A) which precludes lawyer from
representing clients who have differing interests unless client consents after full disclosure; and
EC 4-4 which discusses attorney-client privilege), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

801:1101

(1985); Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 83-25 (1983) (interpreting DR 5-105 concerning representation of clients when independent professional judgment of lawyer is impaired; and EC 5-1 which states a lawyer should exercise professional
judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:2061 (1985); cf Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 644 (1980) (exception to general prohibition against representation of lender and borrower only after consent upon full disclosure per DR 5-101 and EC
5-15), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:3001 (1985). See generally MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Canon 5 (1980) (lawyer should exercise independent profes-

sional judgment when representing a client), reprinted in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:301 (1985);
Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transactions: Dual Representation - Lawyers
Stretching the Rules, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 73, 84-86 (1983) (general discussion on borrower-lender conflicts).
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has been made of the possible adverse effect such representation may
have on the exercise of the attorney's independent professional judgment.' If dual representation is undertaken, the lawyer should constantly monitor the situation to ensure that the interests of each client
are adequately protected and that each client is adequately advised.4 1

The New York City Bar Association has adopted a more restrictive
rule with respect to multiple representation of a lender and a borrower. Under the New York City rule, an attorney may represent a
lender and borrower only if: (1) the parties have agreed to the terms
of the loan without involvement of the attorney; (2) the attorney's
total involvement is ministerial; and (3) there is little flexibility in the
loan documentation and terms. 42 The New York City Bar Association would prohibit a lawyer from representing both parties, even
40. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 81-4 (1981) (interpreting DR 5-105 (C) which allows representation of multiple clients if
attorney can adequately represent client's interest and all clients consent after full disclosure),
summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:6319 (1985); accord Birmingham Bar Ass'n, Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 3 (1981) (interpreting DR 5-105 (A) which precludes lawyer from
representing clients who have differing interests unless client consents after full disclosure; and
EC 4-4 which discusses attorney-client privilege), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:1101
(1985); Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 83-25 (1983) (interpreting DR 5-105 concerning representation of clients when independent professional judgment of lawyer is impaired; and EC 5-1 which states a lawyer should exercise professional
judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:2061 (1985); cf Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 644 (1980) (exception to general prohibition against representation of lender and borrower only after consent upon full disclosure per DR 5-101 and EC
5-15), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3001 (1985). See generally MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980) (lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment when representing a client), reprinted in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:301 (1985);
Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transactions: Dual Representation - Lawyers
Stretching the Rules, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 73, 84-86 (1983) (general discussion on borrower-lender conflicts).
41. See Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 644 (1980), summa-

rized in

THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3001 (1985); see also Crest Inv. Trust Co. v. Comstrock, 327
A.2d 891, 904-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (lawyer must continually weigh possibility that
his independent professional judgment is not impaired when dual representation is
undertaken).
42. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 81-4 (1981) (relying on DR 5-105 (C) which allows an attorney to represent multiple
clients as long as clients are adequately represented and each consents after full disclosure),
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with consent, if the transaction involves actual negotiation of, or bargaining over, the terms and conditions of the loan. 3
2.

Lawyer Representing Buyer and Seller

The rules applicable to dual representation of a lender and a borrower are similarly applied to buyer and seller conflicts of interest. A
lawyer may represent both the buyer and seller in a real estate transaction so long as consent has been obtained from both parties after
full disclosure has been given, and no subsequent dispute arises between the parties." If there exists a likelihood of subsequent disagreement between the buyer and seller, the attorney should not undertake
the dual representation.45
summarized in

THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:6319 (1985).

43. See id. at 801:6319. In New Jersey, if the attorney for the lender and borrower
owns a beneficial interest in the title company involved in the transaction, there is an absolute
conflict of interest that cannot be remedied even after full disclosure and consent. See New
Jersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 495 (1982) (relying on DR 5-101, 5-105,
5-107), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:5807 (1985).
44. See Virginia State Bar, Virginia State Bar Council, Op. 414 (1983) (relying on DR 5105 which allows representation of multiple clients so long as independent professional judgment is not impaired and consent of all clients has been obtained following full disclosure),
summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:8805 (1985); see also In re Samuels, 674 P.2d 1166, 117273 (Or. 1983) (representation is allowed when consent is obtained after full disclosure is given
and no differing interest subsequently arise); In re Boivin, 533 P.2d 171, 175 (Or. 1975) (consent must be obtained after full disclosure is given and no future conflict arises). In an Indiana
case, a conflict arose when the attorney representing both the buyer and seller relayed inaccurate facts about the land to the buyer based upon the seller's representations. See In re Banta,
412 N.E.2d 221, 222 (Ind. 1980). The court found that the representation of both parties
constituted multiple employment and determined that the independent professional judgment
of the lawyer had been impaired. See id. at 222. Such conduct was held -to be an adverse
reflection on the attorney's fitness to practice law and resulted in a public reprimand. See id. at
222; cf Phillips v. Campbell, 480 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [14th Dist.]
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (real estate broker may act as agent for both buyer and seller with full
knowledge and consent of both principals). See generally In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076, 1079-82
(N.J. 1978) (discussion of adequate disclosure and consent when there is dual representation in
a real estate transaction).
45. See Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 82-12 (1983)
(relying on DR 4-101, 5-102, 5-105), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:2056 (1985).
While in many situations an attorney's representation of both the buyer and seller in a real
estate transaction may create a conflict of interest, if the parties have already agreed on the
basic terms of the agreement and the attorney acts primarily as a scrivener, he may normally
represent both parties after obtaining their consent. See Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp.,
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3. Lawyer Representing Title Insurer and Another Party
Authorities are divergent on the role an attorney may assume in
representing multiple parties if one of those parties is a title insurer.
Formal Opinion 331 of the American Bar Association states that a
lawyer who performs legal services for both a title company and a
party in a real estate transaction may represent both parties only if
two conditions are satisfied: (1) it must be obvious that the lawyer
can adequately represent the interest of each; and (2) both the title
company and the other party must consent to the dual representation
after full disclosure of the possible effects the dual representation may
have on the exercise of the lawyer's independent professional

judgment.4 6

Texas allows an attorney representing another party to a transaction to accept a portion of the title insurance premium; 47 however, the
attorney may not receive any portion of the title premium that exInc., 586 P.2d 1378, 1384 (Idaho 1978). In Beal, the court found that when there was no
showing that the land sales contract drafted by the attorney varied from the terms previously
negotiated between the buyer and seller, there was no conflict. See id. at 1384; see also Blevin
v. Mayfield, 189 Cal.App.2d 649, 651, 11 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (no conflict
since agreement had already been reached, therefore, attorney was merely a scrivener); Aronson, Conflict ofInterests, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807, 826 (1977) (if parties already agreed to basic
terms and attorney acts as "scrivener" no conflict occurs). When an attorney is represented by
both parties to draft the appropriate documents, the attorney must explain with the utmost
care, to each party, the effects of any provision adverse to the interest of that party. See
Peaslee v. Pedco, Inc., 388 A.2d 103, 107 (Me. 1978).
46. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 331 (1972),
reprinted in 59 A.B.A.J. 311 (1973). But see New Jersey Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
495 (1982) (absolute conflict to represent title insurer, lender, and borrower), summarized in
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA

LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFES-

SIONAL CONDUCT 801:5807 (1985). The ABA would apply the same rule when the lawyer,
while not performing legal services for the title insurer, owns a beneficial interest in the company that will supply title insurance to the client. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 331 (1972), reprinted in 59 A.B.A.J. 311-12; see also Collins v.
Pioneer Title Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 429, 434 (1980) (attorney must make full disclosures concerning title policy to client). See generally Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transactions: Dual Representation- Lawyers Stretching the Rules, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 73, 93103 (1983) (discussion of various relationships between attorneys and title companies that result in conflict of interest); Comment, Washington Title Insurer'sDuty to Search and Disclose,
4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 212, 215 (1980) (attorney has duty to disclose interest in title
company that supplies title insurance to client); ABA Spec. Comm. on Residential Real Estate
Transactions, THE LAWYERS PROPER ROLE - SERVICES - COMPENSATION (1978) (interest
in title company must be disclosed by attorney to client).
47. See State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Op. 408 (undated), reprintedin 48 TEX. B.J. 44 (1984) (relying on DR 5-105 discussing
impairment of independent professional judgment of attorney and full disclosure and consent
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ceeds the attorney's usual fees for services actually rendered to the
title company.48 By accepting a portion of the premium, the attorney
becomes the lawyer for the title company. 9 This requires disclosure
of the lawyer's relationship with the title company to all the clients in
accordance with the "usual and customary" rules of dual representation."o A more stringent policy has been adopted in Maine. Although
dual representation of a title company and a party is permitted, any
compensation received by a lawyer, acting as agent for a title company, must be credited to the bill of the client to the extent the compensation from the title company represents a fee for title work for
which the client has already been billed."1
New Hampshire permits an attorney, who owns an interest in the
subject property or the title company, to act as both title examiner
and agent for a title company while representing a party to a transaction, so long as the consent of the client is obtained after full disclosure to the client.52 On the other hand, Maryland limits the role of
the title company's attorney to the drafting, execution and filing of
closing documents.5 3 Maryland also requires that each client be provided with a full explanation of the lawyer's limited role, the amount
and source of his fee, and the potential effect the multiple representation may have on the exercise of the lawyer's independent professional
judgment.54 North Carolina and New Jersey have taken the strictest
approach in this area. In North Carolina, a lawyer who owns a beneficial interest in property is prohibited from certifying the title or perof each client); see also Wilson, Ethical Responsibilitiesof Real Estate Attorneys, State Bar of
Texas Advanced Real Estate Law Course E-8 to E-13 (1981).
48. See State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Op. 408 (undated), reprinted in 48 TEX. B.J. 44, 44 (1984).
49. See id. at 44.
50. See id. at 44.
51. See Maine State Bar Ass'n, The Grievance Comm. of the Board of Overseers of the
Bar, Op. 40 (1983), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA

801:4206-07 (1985).
52. See New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 3 (1981) (relying on DR 5-101, 5105, and 5-107 discussing impairment of lawyer's independent professional judgment and full

LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

disclosure and consent of each client), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:5701 (1985).

53. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-7 (1982) (relying on DR 5105, EC 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17 discussing interests of multiple clients), summarized in THE
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT 801:4323 (1985).
54. See id. at 801:4323.
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forming other legal services on behalf of a purchaser of such
property.55 In New Jersey, an attorney who owns a beneficial interest
in a title company insuring title is absolutely barred from representing
a lender and borrower in the same transaction.56
4. Lawyer Also Acting As Broker
In certain states, a lawyer may not act as both the broker and the
attorney for either the purchaser or seller in a real estate transaction,
regardless of whether the lawyer or another salesperson in the same
office lists or sells the property." The basis for this rule is the inherent conflict of interest that arises when the lawyer/broker has a financial stake in the outcome of the sale.5" Similarly, some jurisdictions
prohibit a lawyer from representing either party when the lawyer's
spouse is the listing or selling agent.59 In Texas, attorneys may serve
55. See North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (1981) (relying on EC 52 in discussing conflicts between attorney's personal interest and client's interests), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:6606 (1985).
56. See New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 495 (1982) (relying on
DR 5-101, 5-105, 5-107 discussing impairment of lawyer's independent judgment; need for full
disclosure and consent of each client), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:5807 (1985).
57. See New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 514 (1983) (relying on
DR 5-101 discussing impairment of lawyer's independent professional judgment), summarized
in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFES-

SIONAL CONDUCT 801:5810 (1985); North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 307
(1981) (relying on DR 5-101 discussing impairment of lawyer's independent professional judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:6607 (1985).
58. See New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 514 (1983) (relying on
DR 5-101 discussing impairment of lawyer's independent professional judgment), summarized
in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:5810 (1985); North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 307

(1981) (relying on DR 5-101 discussing impairment of lawyer's independent professional judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:6607 (1985); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Sybert, 456 A.2d 20, 28 (N.D. 1983) (in limited circumstances, an attorney may perform certain acts associated with sale of real estate without being licensed as a broker).
59. See New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 518 (1983) (lawyer may
not represent party in real estate transaction when lawyer's spouse is listing or selling agent),
summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL

ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:5811 (1985); Oregon State Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op.
472 (1982) (a lawyer who is married to real estate broker may not represent a seller or purchaser if selling agreement is listed with spouse), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA

LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

801:7109

(1985).
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as brokers pursuant to the Real Estate Licensing Act, 6° when brokerage services are merely incident to the legal services performed by the
attorney. 6' While attorneys are specifically exempt from the provisions of the Act, the attorney is nonetheless bound by the Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules of the Texas Code of
Professional Responsibility when secondarily serving as the broker.
5.

Lawyer Representing Governmental and Private Interests

Different jurisdictions have adopted varying rules regarding conflicts of interest arising from an attorney's representation of a governmental entity and a private client in the same matter. In Connecticut,
an attorney who represents an independent town agency before the
planning and zoning authorities of the town may also represent private clients before the planning and zoning authorities, so long as
those clients do not have interests differing from those of the agency.62
By contrast, in Indiana, a law firm, whose member is a county attorney, may not represent clients before the Area Planning Commission
or the County Board of Zoning Appeals.6 3 Maryland permits an attorney to represent multiple governmental bodies, such as a town, historic area, commission, and board of appeals so long as each entity
authorizes and consents to the representation." 4 Should the lawyer
60. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985). For a general discussion and analysis of the Real Estate License Act, see Amdur, Real Estate License
Act, 12 S.TEX. L.J. 269 (1971).
61. See Sherman v. Bruton, 497 S.W.2d 316, 321-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no
writ). The Sherman case also states that an attorney/broker/engineer who acts in the capacity
of a broker could not recover fees for legal or engineering services since there was not written
contract to support recovery of a commission as required by section 28 of the Real Estate
Licensing Act. See id.at 323.
62. See Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 80-17 (1980)
(relying on Canon 5 and DR 5-105 discussing necessity of lawyer's exercise of independent
professional judgment when representing clients), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:2051
(1985).
63. See Indiana State Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1 (1980) (relying on DR 4101, other members of law firm prohibited from representing private entity at zoning hearing),
summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3301 (1985). In a New Jersey case, the court found that
an attorney who was a member of a city planning board should not represent clients in matters
that must come before the body of which he is a member. See In re Shear, 371 A.2d 282, 283
(N.J. 1977). The court stated that a conflict is still present even if another attorney is retained
to represent the client before the board. See id. at 284-85.
64. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 82-55 (1982) (relying on DR 5105 and 7-110 discussing impairment of independent professional judgment and contact with
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find that he represents both a public body and a private entity in the
same matter, he may proceed until the representation requires the
lawyer to take inconsistent positions.65 When this occurs, withdrawal
is the appropriate remedy.66
6.

Lawyer as Investor or Principal

When a lawyer acts both as attorney and principal in a business
venture, conflicts may arise. The San Diego Bar Association permits
a lawyer to act as promoter of, and legal advisor to, an investment
plan, as well as an investor in that plan, provided he discloses his
various capacities and interests to the other investors.6 7 In order to
ensure that all investors are aware of the potential for conflict, the San
Diego Bar Association has taken the position that the attorney must
not only encourage the prospective investors to obtain advice from
independent counsel but must also obtain written consent from such
investors to continue as the entity's legal counsel.68
An opinion of the Maryland State Bar provides that a potential
conflict of interest arises when a lawyer receives an undisclosed commission from a client's investment in a business transaction. 69 The
Maryland Bar would allow the lawyer to continue to represent the

officials), summarized in THE

BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'

801:4320 (1985). In a New Jersey case, the court
held that one attorney may represent more than one township entity provided: (1) each entity
consents; (2) full disclosure is made; and (3) there are no conflicts. See DeLuca v. Kahr Bros.,
Inc., 407 A.2d 1285, 1289 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1979). The court concluded that should a future
conflict arise, the attorney must completely withdraw and not represent any of the entities. See
id. at 1289.
65. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 82-55 (1982) (relying on DR 5105 and 7-110 discussing impairment of independent professional judgment and contact with
public officials), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

66.
67.
1 (1984)
lawyers,

801:4320 (1985).

See id. at 801:4320.
San Diego County Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics and Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 1984(relying on Rule 3-102, 3-103 and 5-101 discussing financial arrangements with nonforming a partnership with non-lawyers and avoiding adverse interest), summarized

in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:1804 (1985).

68. See id. at 801:1804.
69. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 82-42 (1982) (relying on DR 5105, EC 5-1, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16 and Canon 9 discussing impairment of independent professional
judgment when representing multiple clients and necessity for attorney to avoid appearance of
professional impropriety), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.,
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:4318 (1985).
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client, but acceptance of a commission from one other than the client
is allowed only after the client consents. 70 Full disclosure of the potential adverse effect upon the lawyer's independent professional judgment must precede the client's consent to the representation.7 1
Similarly, in a State Bar of Michigan opinion, an attorney who
represented a client in an unsuccessful attempt to publicly sell a mortgage, may not thereafter purchase the mortgage, absent the client's
informed consent. 72 A subsequent Michigan opinion permits a lawyer
to purchase real property from a client provided: (1) the client consents after full disclosure has been made; (2) the transaction does not
otherwise give the appearance of impropriety; and (3) the lawyer is
not prevented from exercising independent professional judgment by
virtue of an interest in acquiring the property." In such a situation,
the Michigan Bar admonishes the lawyer to encourage the client to
seek independent counsel.74
7. Lawyer as Bank Director
A lawyer who serves as both a director of a bank and counsel for
the institution creates the potential for conflict. 7" An attorney who
serves as a director should not participate in board of directors deci70. See id. at 801:4318.
71. See id. at 801:4318; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-105 (C) (1980) (discussing requirement for full disclosure), reprinted in THE BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

§ 1:301 (1985).
72. See State Bar of Michigan, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-615
(1981) (relying on DR 5-104 and Canon 5 discussing business relations with a client and the
necessity for the attorney to exercise independent professional judgment), summarized in THE
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT 1 801:4819 (1985).
73. See State Bar of Michigan, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-627
(1981) (relying on DR 5-104 and Canons 5 and 9 discussing business relations with a client
and the necessity for attorney to exercise independent professional judgment along with avoiding even the appearance of professional impropriety), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

801:4821 (1985).
74. See id. at 801:4821.
75. See 12 C.F.R. § 571.8 (1985) (Statement of Policy); FHLBB Reg. 83-548, 48 FED.
REG. 45-382 (1983) (explanation of conflicts of interest regulations). Additional responsibilities of and restrictions upon bank directors may be found in the regulations of the Federal
Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of
47,168;
the Currency. See IV CCH BANKING LAW REPORTER Interlocking Directorates
47,205 (1982) (contains Federal Reserve and other agencies' provisions prohibiting interlocking directorates).
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sions, or participate in loan committee action on applications for bank
loans, involving other clients of the attorney.7 6
8.

Referrals Between Broker and Lawyer

There is no express prohibition against a lawyer referring clients to
a real estate broker if the lawyer is not compensated for the referral.7 7
The Dallas Bar Association has opined that a lawyer may accept compensation from a broker for a referral relating to a transaction for
which the attorney has performed legal services but only after full
disclosure of the commission arrangement and then only with consent
of the client.7 8 On the other hand, New Jersey totally prohibits an
attorney from representing a fee-paying buyer in transactions where
the attorney originated mortgage financing on a referral fee basis with
the mortgage broker.7 9
9.

Solicitation by Lender's Lawyer

A lawyer should not not send letters to potential clients seeking
76. See State Bar of Michigan, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-867
(1983) (relying on DR 4-101 and 5-105 discussing preservation of the client's secrets and confidences and the attorney's impairment of independent professional judgment), summarized in
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFES-

SIONAL CONDUCT 801:4856 (1985).
77. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 82-63 (1982) (relying on DR 2103 and 5-101 discussing recommendation of professional employment and the lawyer's impairment of independent professional judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:4321
(1985).
78. See Dallas Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1981-1 (1981) (relying on DR 5-104
and 5-107; EC 5-2, 5-21, and 5-22; and Canon 5 discussing limiting business relations with
clients and avoiding influence by third parties), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:8402-03
(1985); accord Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 81-84 (1981) (attorney may retain referral fee provided client was aware of fee), summarized in THE BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

801:7520 (1985); see also In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076, 1078 (N.J. 1978) (purchaser uses seller's
attorney and pays legal fees). See generally Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate
Transactions: Dual Representation- Lawyers Stretching the Rules, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
73, 87-88 (1983) (discussing attorney conflicts with real estate brokers).
79. See New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 463 (1980) (relying on
DR 5-107 discussing the attorney's need to avoid the influence of third parties when representing a client), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:5802 (1985); see also In re Dolan, 384
A.2d 1076, 1078 (N.J. 1978) (discussing conflicts of interest arising out of multiple representations at real estate closings).
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employment for closing real estate loans and handling foreclosures in
which the lawyer implies that he or she will be able to influence financial institutions represented by the lawyer. 0 Such representations
create the impression that the lawyer would be putting his own financial and personal interests above those of the client thus giving rise to
an appearance of impropriety. 1
B.

Adverse Representation

When a lawyer undertakes to represent interests which are adverse
to an existing or former client conflicts of interest may arise. In real
estate transactions, such conflicts of interest are most likely to arise in
foreclosure litigation. There is a potential conflict when the attorney
who represented one of the parties to the initial closing represents the
holder of the mortgage foreclosing on property. 2 The conflict results
from the obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets
of the client during and after termination of the attorney-client relationship.83 To avoid such a conflict, a lawyer who serves as trustee
under a deed of trust should not subsequently represent either the
borrower or the lender in foreclosure proceedings.8 4 An effective so80. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 81-10 (1980) (relying on DR 2101, 2-103, 5-101, 5-105, and 5-107 and Canon 5 discussing publicity and recommendation of
professional employment and the impairment of the attorney's independent professional judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:4306 (1985).
81. See id. at 801:4306. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE

BAR OF TEXAS art. XII, § 9 (Code of Professional Responsibility) Canon 9 (1982) [hereinafter

cited

as TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFES-

SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980), reprintedin THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,

INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:346 (1985).
82. See North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 325 (1983) (utilizing DR 4101 to prohibit an attorney, employed by lender, from representing trustee at foreclosure),
summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL

ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:6607 (1985).
83. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4; 4-5; 4-6 (1980), reprinted in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:305 (1985).
84. See North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 325 (1983) (lawyer employed
by lender may not also represent trustee in foreclosure), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

801:6609 (1985); North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 309 (1981) (relying on
DR 4-101 discussing preservation of a client's confidences and secrets), summarized in THE
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT 801:6607 (1985); Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 644
(1980) (relying on Rules 4-101 and 5-101 discussing the necessity to preserve the client's

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol17/iss1/4

20

Sanford: Ethical, Statutory, and Regulatory Conflicts of Interest in Real

19851

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN REAL ESTATE

lution to this type of conflict is to appoint a substitute trustee.
Generally, a lawyer may not represent any party with interests adverse to those of an existing client even when the matters are separate
and distinct, unless both clients give their informed consent after full
disclosure, and it is obvious that the lawyer's representation of the
new client will not impair the representation of the existing client.8 5
The test to be applied to determine the effect of adverse representation
varies among authorities.8 6 In InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.
v. Levin, 17 the Third Circuit presumed an adverse affect on the professional judgment of the lawyer when the lawyer represents a position
adverse to an existing client.8 " The ABA Standing Committee on
secrets and confidences), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.,
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3001 (1985).
85. See THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 51:101 (1985); see also Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc.,
646 F.2d 1339, 1344-46 (9th Cir. 1981) (presumption of adverse affect rebutted upon disclosure and informed consent by all clients and showing that clients adequately represented); City
Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Home, 571 F. Supp. 965, 971-72 (C.D. Utah 1983) (client must be
adequately represented and must consent after full disclosure has been made); Bankers Trust
of South Carolina v. Bruce, 323 S.E.2d 523, 530 (S.C. 1984) (a client must be adequately
represented and client must consent after full disclosure has been made). After a lawyer's
representation of a client ceases, the lawyer may with consent of the former client, represent
another client in the same or a substantially related matter in which the new client's interests
are materially adverse to those of the former client. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Triumvera
Homeowners, 440 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
86. See Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Cinema 5
Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495 (1982), reprintedin THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:340 (1985); see
also Sapienza v. New York News, 481 F. Supp. 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (consent cannot
justify representing party against present client's interests); E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305
F. Supp. 371, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (DR 5-105 requires explicit disclosure of facts to meet
informed consent requirement).
87. 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
88. See id. at 280. Levin was an anti-trust action against IBM based upon alleged monopolistic credit practices. The firm representing the plaintiff, Levin, also performed legal services
for IBM in an unrelated area, labor union negotiations. During the course of the anti-trust
action, the law firm actively represented IBM in labor negotiations. Several attorneys in the
firm knew of this dual and possibly adverse representation. See id. at 277-80. While the Second Circuit concluded that this form of representation raised a presumption of adverse effect,
it also found that the law firm and its attorneys had failed to adequately disclose the nature of
the conflict to the clients so as to allow such representation. See id. at 281-82. The court held
that the attorneys shouldered the responsibility to disclose all relevant facts to their clients so
that the clients could make an informed decision. See id. at 282. In Levin the attorneys failed
to explicitly disclose the conflict and argued that the clients had constructive knowledge of the
conflict; the court rejected this attempt to validate the adverse multiple representation. See id.
at 282; see also E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (DR 5-
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Ethics and Professional Responsibility espoused a per se prohibition
against accepting employment for a new client, if the representation is
adverse to an existing client.89 In Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama,Inc., 90
the Second Circuit adopted the following standard: "[w]here the relationship is a continuing one, adverse representation is prima facie improper

. . .

and the attorney must be prepared to show, at the very

least, that there will be no actual or apparent conflict in loyalties or
diminution in the vigor of his representation." 9 One New York federal district court has held consent to the successive representation to

be ineffective when the clients' interests are directly adverse to each
other.92 Furthermore, the Model Code requires a lawyer to decline
proferred employment if the representation would be adverse to the
interests of an existing client. 93
105 requires explicit disclosure of facts to client so as to allow informed consent; constructive
knowledge insufficient).
89. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495
(1982) (relying on Rule 1.7 discussing the prohibition of a lawyer from accepting representation directly adverse to an existing client even in unrelated matters), summarized in THE BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA

CONDUCT

LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL

801:340 (1985).

90. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
91. See id. at 1387. The conflict in question arose from the relationship between the firm
representing the plaintiff and the firm representing the defendant in this corporate take-over

dispute. An attorney, Manly Fleischmann, was a partner in both of the law firms involved in
the suit. The Second Circuit affirmed the motion disqualifying plaintiff's attorneys because the
professional standards of keeping client's secrets and confidences and avoiding an appearance
of impropriety had been breached. See id. at 1385. The court reasoned that an attorney or a
law firm could not fulfill its duty to act as the client's fiduciary and simultaneously represent
interests adverse to the client. See id. at 1387; see also American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co.,
436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1971) (if attorney breaches fiduciary duties through multiple
representation, law firm also disqualified). Most writers in this area agree that representation
adverse to existing clients should be avoided because of its inappropriate appearance. See
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 112, 116 (3d ed. 1976); WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 256 (2d ed. 1971).
92. See Sapienza v. New York News, 481 F. Supp. 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (motion to
disqualify granted on grounds that consent to representation insufficient because clients' interests directly adverse). In Sapienza an attorney attempted to represent both the plaintiff and a
principal defendant in an anti-trust action. The court granted the defendant's motion to disqualify filed by the defendant's office counsel, reasoning that an attorney can never represent
both parties to an adversarial action. See id. at 678-79 (construing the requirements of DR 5105); see also Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 135 A.2d 252, 254 (Pa. 1957) ("[n]o one
could conscionably contend that the same attorney may represent both the plaintiff and defendant in an adversary action").
93. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980) (discussing

impairment of attorney's independent professional judgment), reprinted in THE BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA

LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

§ 1:301 (1985).
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Once the attorney-client relationship terminates, a lawyer may not
represent a new client in a substantially related matter in which the
new client's interests are materially adverse to those of a former client
without consent of the former client.9 4 The limitations on representation adverse to the interests of a former client are based on the duty to
preserve confidences and secrets of a client even after termination of
the employment. 95 The test applied by most jurisdictions in assessing
former representation conflicts is whether the subject matter is "substantially related." 96 The facts, circumstances, and legal issues involved in the former representation must be scrutinized to determine
97
whether they are substantially related to the present matter.
Under certain circumstances, a law firm may represent a bank in
foreclosure actions against a former client for whom the firm had
done a number of real estate closings.9" The current legal matter
94. See Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 850-51 (1st Cir. 1984) (lawyer may not represent an adversary to former client unless consent is given); Whiting Corp. v. White Machinery
Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1977) (attorney must obtain former client's consent if con-

flict arises); Oyster v. Bell Asbestos Mines, 568 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (when defending third party with interest adverse to former client consent must be obtained from former
client); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Triumvera Homeowners, 440 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) (consent of former client required).
95. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6; DR 4-101 (1980)
(duty to preserve secrets and confidences of clients), reprinted in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1:298

(1985).
96. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instr. Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721-22 (7th Cir.
1982) (question of substantial relationship is question of fact); Silver Chrysler Plymouth v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) (attorney's previous activities must
be examined before ruling on disqualification); Hydril Co. v. Multiflex, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 552,
554 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (mere advice to party cannot be basis for disqualifying firm when later
opposing party on another issue). See generally Greene, Everybody's Doing It-But Who
Should Be? Standing to Make a DisqualificationMotion Based on an Attorney's Representation
of a Client with Interests Adverse to Those of a Former Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 205,
210-29 (1983).
97. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 22, 28 (3d Cir. 1980) (evidence of actual consultation with party necessary to justify disqualification on adverse repre-

sentation grounds); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir.
1978) (test requires examination of question of evidence to support disqualification); Realco
Services v. Holt, 479 Supp. 867, 872 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (court must consider all facts in regard to
prior representation when ruling on motion to disqualify lawyer and his firm). See generally

Note, Motions to Disqualify Counsel Representing an Interest Adverse to a Former Client, 57
TEXAS L. REV. 726, 728-34 (1979) (discussing disclosure, consent, and rebutting a presumption of disqualification).
98. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 82-51 (1982) (relying on DR 4101 and 5-105 discussing preservation of client's secrets and confidences and impairment of
attorney's independent professional judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL
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must be separate from any matter previously handled for the former
client, and no privileges, confidences, or information, which may have
been obtained, can be used to improperly aid the firm in the matter
against the former client. 99 For example, if the prior representation
included the mortgage sought to be foreclosed, the current matter
would not be "separate," and representation would be barred."° In
accord with this rule, North Carolina would permit a lawyer to represent a client in an ejectment action against his partner's former client
where the former representation is unrelated to the present action,
and no relevant confidences or secrets were received by the lawyer's
partner.10 1
Movement by attorneys from one job to another is also a source for
conflicts of interest. It is increasingly common for an attorney, especially early in practice, to change jobs one or more times. Attorneys
move from government practice to private practice, and vice versa,
and also move within the private sector. A potential conflict arises
when a lawyer acquires confidences and secrets of a client, then
changes employment.10 2 When a potential conflict is identified as
having arisen because of an attorney's former representation of a client while with a previous employer, the effect will vary depending on
the nature of the work performed by the attorney at the former firm.
Factors to be considered when assessing conflicts arising because of
attorney movement include: identification of the matters previously
handled by the attorney at the former firm, the nature and extent to
which confidences or secrets of the client divulged to the attorney
while handling matters for the client at the former firm, the relation-

ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
(1985).
99. See id. at 801:4319-20.
100. See id. at 1 801:4319-20.
AFFAIRS, INC.,

MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

801:4319-20

101. See North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 309 (1981) (relying on DR
4-101 discussing preservation of client's secrets and confidences), summarized in THE BUREAU

ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:6607 (1985).
102. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) (duty to preserve client's secrets and confidences), reprinted in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1:298 (1985); see also
TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1982) (requiring preservation of
client's secrets and confidences). The Fifth Circuit has considered this requirement only in the
criminal context, but the court did disqualify an attorney and his law firm on the grounds of
ensuring a prior client's confidences. See United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 904 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979).
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.,
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ship of matters handled by the two firms, and the measures
taken by
1°3
the present firm to avoid ethical conflicts of interest.
If an attorney was privy to confidences and secrets of a former client at his or her former employer, the risk is that such knowledge may
be imputed to the entire new firm.' °4 Courts in various jurisdictions
have addressed this issue and have reached varying results. In Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 105 the defendant
moved to disqualify the plaintiff's attorney and his law firm on the
ground that the plaintiff's attorney had been previously associated
with the law firm representing the defendant."16 The Second Circuit
determined that the nature and extent of the attorney's work at his
old firm was not substantially related to the matters being handled by
103. See Miller and Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and
Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 631, 643-49 (1983).
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983), reprintedin VII
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VII at 12 (1985 ed.); see also THE BUREAU
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

1:125 (1985). Rule 1.10 is derived from DR 5-105 (D) which generally provides that if an
attorney in a law firm is disqualified because of ethical conflicts, the firm is also disqualified.
Rule 1.10 reads:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm
with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests
are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited
from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client
represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and
1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under
the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983).

105. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
106. See id. at 752. An automobile dealer brought an action against the manufacturer.
The manufacturer brought a motion to disqualify the automobile dealer's attorney on the
ground that the attorney was once a summer associate with an eighty-man firm that represented the manufacturer. See id. at 752-53. The court held that where the attorney's involvement with cases relating to the manufacturer was limited to briefs, informal discussions on
procedural matters, and research on specific points of law. This evidence was sufficient to
rebut the presumption that confidential information was acquired. See id. at 757.
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his new firm, therefore, the court denied the defendant's motion to
disqualify. 1°7 The Seventh Circuit in LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of
Lake, 1I conducted a three-level inquiry in determining the effect of a
conflict alleged to have resulted from movement by an attorney.10 9
First, the scope of the prior legal representation must be determined;
second, it must be determined whether it would be reasonable to infer
that the confidential client information allegedly possessed by the new
lawyer would have been given to that lawyer in the course of his or
her prior representation of that client; and third, it must be determined whether that information is relevant to the issues raised in the
present matter against the former client.11 0 Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have applied a "rebuttable presumption" standard in
attorney-movement cases thereby requiring the attorney to affirmatively disprove any alleged conflict of interest."'
In the event a conflict of interest arises because of attorney movement, the conflict may be resolved by consent of the former client or,
in some jurisdictions, by "screening" the attorney within the new
firm. 1 2 "Screening" an attorney has been referred to as erecting
"Chinese Walls" around an attorney within a firm to avoid a conflict
of interest." 3 Screening attempts to prevent the new attorney from
handling client matters which could raise a conflict.
Model Rule 1.10 deals directly with the problem of imputed disqualification resulting from movement of attorneys." 4 Rule 1.10

107. See id. at 756-57.
108. 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983).
109. See id. at 255-56. In this case, the county sewer system moved to disqualify the
plaintiff's law firm because an associate formerly represented the county. The court disqualified the lawyer because he did work on similar sewage agreements and had knowledge of the
county's attitude or policy toward sewer service in general. See id. at 257-58.
110. See id. at 255-56.
111. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983) (rebuttal presumption overcome by attorney); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) (presumption was rebutted by attorney and law firm).
112. Compare Chung v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980) (unilateral screening
of new attorney rejected), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981) with Schiessle v.
Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983) (unilateral screening sufficient to prevent disqualification of new firm).
113. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 230 (2d Cir.
1977) (screening created a "Chinese Wall"); Weglarz v. Bruck, 470 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. App.
1984) (screening merely erecting a "Chinese Wall").
114. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983) (general rule of
imputed disqualification), reprinted in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part
VII at 12 (1985 ed.).
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adopts the rule of imputed disqualification with respect to lawyers
currently associated with a firm in order to insure that the firm itself
meets its obligation of loyalty to its clients, but rejects any per se rule
of disqualification."' Thus, the Model Rules adopt an approach
which combines the rules of Silver Chrysler and LaSalle by stating
that the inference of knowledge, obtained by an attorney in his former
employment, is rebuttable. Rule 1.10, however, does not contain
a provision for screening an attorney who fails to rebut the
presumption. 116
III.

AVOIDANCE AND RESOLUTION OF ETHICAL
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Before representing a new client or beginning representation for an
existing client on a new matter, a simple conflicts of interest check
should be made to identify potential or existing conflicts of interest.
The attorney, or the firm, should maintain a compilation or list containing certain basic information such as the names of all existing clients and the matters being handled for each client. For
organizational clients, this list should include the names of all principals in the organization. In addition, there should be a record of all
other parties involved in each matter for each client. Prior to opening
a new client file, or a new matter file for an existing client, a review of
this data should be made. If this information is listed on the new file
memorandum for each client and matter, and a copy of each memo115. See id. at 12; see also THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1:125-27 (1985); Miller and Warren,
Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW 631,
643-49 (1983) (discussion on the problem of imputed disqualification due to movement of
attorneys).
116. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983) (general rule of
imputed disqualification), reprinted in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part
VII at 12 (1985 ed.). Screening procedures, while a possible method to prevent conflicts from
arising, have been unsuccessful in preventing disqualification of small firms once the conflict of
interest has been raised. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225,
229 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Chinese Wall" cannot be built within single, small law firm); Weglarz v.
Bruck, 470 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. App. 1982) (screening procedure could not defeat motion to
disqualify law firm which contained only twenty-five attorneys). The "Chinese Wall" defense,
while a practical solution to attorney-movement ethical problems, is a demanding standard. It
requires the attorney to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she had no knowledge of the challenging client's secrets or confidences. See Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instr.
Co., 689 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1982). As a general rule a court will resolve any doubt in
favor of disqualification. See Weglarz v. Bruck, 470 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. App. 1984).
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randum is kept in a single binder, all necessary information to monitor for conflicts will be readily accessible.
For large firms, the system for checking conflicts will need to be
more refined, especially when the firm has multiple offices in different
cities, states or countries. With the increased prevalence of computers
and data communication equipment in law offices, the firm's database
containing the basic client information previously discussed can be
used for conflicts checks. Because most computer systems allow
searching by key words, potential conflicts should be readily ascertainable. If the multi-office firm's database is linked by communication lines so that any office has immediate access to all of the firm's
file lists, conflicts verification should be relatively simple. If this capability does not exist, one lawyer in each of the firm's offices should be
designated as the "conflicts" liaison. All conflicts checks may then be
routed to the designated attorney, who in turn, contacts his counterparts at the firm's other offices in order to complete the conflicts
check.
When the conflicts check reveals an actual or potential conflict of
interest, the attorney has two options. If the representation will not
adversely affect his or her independent professional judgment, the attorney may accept the representation only after full disclosure of the
nature of the conflict and consent by the client to the representation.
The other option is to decline representation at the outset. If an actual conflict of interest arises after the representation has been accepted such that the attorney is unable to exercise independent
professional judgment because of divided loyalties, the attorney
should withdraw from further representation of either client in the
transaction.117
The prohibitions contained in Canon 5 and DR 5-105(C) against
simultaneous representation of multiple clients may be avoided if each
client consents after full disclosure of the conflict or potential conflict.118 For consent to be effective, however, the attorney must fully
117. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 (9th Cir.

1982) (attorney should not continue employment if conflict impaires independent professional
judgment); Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279-83 (3d Cir. 1978) (relying on DR-101, attorney should withdraw from further representation when independent professional judgment is impaired); In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1974) (where conflict
arises in dual representation, attorney should withdraw pursuant to DR 5-105).
118. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (9th Cir.
1982) (discussing meaning of consent under Canon 5 and DR 5-105); E. F. Hutton & Co. v.
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disclose all of the facts and implications of the representation to all
*affected clients.' 19 The attorney has the burden to affirmatively disclose all relevant facts. 2 ' Consent must be express and based upon
actual knowledge; it will not be implied nor can it rest on constructive
knowledge. 121 Preferably, the client's consent should be in writing.122
If the client is fully apprised of the risks and limitations of multiple
representation before an attorney-client relationship is formed, the
lawyer or law firm should be protected against subsequent challenges
to the representation based upon allegations of conflicts of interest.' 23
The nature of the disclosures by the attorney to the client will determine the effectiveness of a client's consent to representation after
disclosure of a conflict of interest. In InterstateProperties,Inc. v. Pyramid Co., 124 both the plaintiff and defendant were developers who
owned adjacent parcels of land on which each intended to build a
shopping center. In an administrative proceeding involving an application for an environmental permit, Interstate's attorneys were sucBrown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (Dr. 5-105 requires affirmative disclosure and
consent); In re Boivin, 533 P.2d 171, 173-75 (Or. 1975) (consent essential for multiple representation under DR 5-105). See generally Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transactions: DualRepresentation-Lawyers'Stretchingthe Rules, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 73, 8186 (1983) (discussing multiple representation in real estate transactions).
119. See, e.g., Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280-83 (3d Cir.
1978) (attorney must disclose all necessary facts); E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp.
371, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (affirmative disclosure required); In re Boivin, 533 P.2d 171, 173-75
(Or. 1975) (full disclosure is required under DR 5-105).
120. See Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978); see
also State Bar of Texas, Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 408 (undated) (relying on DR 2-106
and 5-105 for support that attorney must disclose adverse facts to client), reprintedin 48 TEX.
B.J. 44 (1984).
121. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1982)
(discussing disclosure, consent and adequate representation in multiple representation cases);
Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280-83 (3rd Cir. 1978) (discussion on
adequate representation of multiple clients and necessity for full disclosure and consent).
122. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1982);
Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280-83 (3rd Cir. 1978).
123. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1982)
(consent must be informed to be effective); Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d
271, 280-83 (3rd Cir. 1978) (consent must be based on full disclosure by attorney). Where dual
representation of both the seller and purchaser in a real estate transaction is sought, the parties
consent must be knowing, intelligent, voluntary and obtained in such a way as to insure that
each party has adequate time to reflect upon the choice. See In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076, 108283 (N.J. 1978). The consent must not be forced upon the client by the exigencies of closing.
See id. at 1083. This also applies to the dual representation of a mortgagor and mortgagee.
See id, at 1083.
124. 547 F. Supp. 178, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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cessful in blocking Pyramid's application. Subsequently, the two
developers formed a joint venture to develop a single mall on their
combined properties. By the terms of the joint venture, Pyramid was
to obtain the necessary environmental permits. The attorneys who
earlier opposed Pyramid's application were retained by Pyramid to
pursue the new application. The permits were issued and, thereafter,
the attorneys continued to represent Pyramid with respect to other
permit applications and eventually the relationship flourished to the
point that the attorneys became Pyramid's general counsel.
A dispute arose between Interstate and Pyramid over the shopping
center joint venture, and a lawsuit was filed by Interstate against Pyramid. The suit was filed by Interstate's attorneys who were by then
also Pyramid's general counsel.125 The attorneys informed Pyramid
they could not continue to represent Pyramid in connection with the
joint shopping center project. The attorneys, however, continued to
represent a subsidiary of Pyramid in environmental matters. Pyramid
filed a motion to disqualify the attorneys from representing Interstate
due to conflicts of interests.I26 The attorneys argued that (1) Pyramid
had waived the right to object to the conflict, and (2) the nature of the
continuing representation of a Pyramid subsidiary eliminated the possibility that confidences regarding the litigation had been communicated to the attorneys. 127 In denying the motion to disqualify, the
district court relied upon1 28a consent letter signed by Pyramid prior to
the filing of the lawsuit.
The consent letter contained the following elements: (1) a grant of
express permission for the attorneys to continue to act as general
counsel for Interstate in any and all pending and future matters including any adversary proceedings that might arise between Interstate
and Pyramid; (2) a clear reminder to Pyramid that it was aware of the
attorneys' representation of Interstate; (3) a reminder that Pyramid
was represented by counsel of its own choosing in connection with the
negotiation, revision, execution, and delivery of the joint venture
agreement; (4) a statement that differences had arisen between Interstate and Pyramid regarding the joint venture and that the attorneys
were representing Interstate in attempting to resolve those differences;
125.
126.
127.
128.

See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

182.
178.
179-80.
179-80.
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(5) an acknowledgment by Pyramid that the attorneys had no confidential or privileged communications that would inhibit the attorneys' representation of Interstate regarding the joint venture
agreement; (6) a caution to Pyramid to have the letter reviewed by
independent counsel prior to signing; and (7) a statement that Pyramid was not relying on any advice from the attorneys but instead was
relying upon advice of independent counsel.129 The district court
scrutinized the contents of the consent letter and determined that the
disclosures, particularly those regarding client confidences and
secrets, were sufficient. 130 The court also held that the1 express con13
sent was effective to defeat the motion to disqualify.
In summary, when an attorney undertakes representation of multiple clients, should a disagreement subsequently arise between the parties, such that the lawyer cannot continue to adequately represent
each of the parties, the lawyer's duty is to withdraw from the representation. Although, as previously discussed, Canon 5 and DR 5-105
permit simultaneous representation after full disclosure and consent,
it nonetheless must be "obvious that [the lawyer] can adequately represent the interest of each [client]."' 32 The Model Rules attempt to
clarify the applicable standards. The comments to Rule 1.7 state that
"loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without the client's consent . . . thus, a lawyer

ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated."' 133 The
Model Rules impose a "directly adverse" standard by which to evaluate multiple representation conflicts. 134 Thus, under the most current
standards, the lawyer, even after consent, should withdraw from the
representation altogether when the clients' interests are directly adverse, and the lawyer cannot adequately represent either party.

129. See id. at 179-80.
130. See id. at 180.
131. See id. at 180.
132. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980), reprinted in
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1:301 (1985).

133. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 Comment [1] (1983), reprinted in VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VII at 8 (1985 ed.).
134. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983), reprinted in VII
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Part VII at 8 (1985 ed.).
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STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The real estate attorney must not only be familiar with the standards of professional conduct governing ethical conflicts of interest,
but he or she must also be cognizant of specific conflicts of interest
that arise by statute or administrative rule when representing lending
institutions and title insurers.
A.

Lender Regulations

The statutes and regulations governing financial institutions prohibit certain activities determined to constitute conflicts of interest.
Regulations governing savings and loan associations provide a comprehensive example of the types of statutory and regulatory conflicts
that may arise when representing a mortgage lender. 35 If a savings
and loan association's deposits are insured by the Federal Savings &
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), the association's activities are
subject to the state as well as Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) Insurance of Accounts Regulations (Insurance Regulations). 36 The Insurance Regulations contain attorney conflicts of interest rules in several areas: (1) composition of the board of directors
135. See 12 C.F.R.

§

571.8 (1985) (Statement of Policy); FHLBB Reg. 83-548, 48

FED.

REG. 45-382 (1983) (explanation of conflicts of interest regulations). Neither the Texas Savings and Loan Act nor the Rules of the Texas Savings and Loan Department contain conflicts
of interest provisions. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.05 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(governing loans to directors and officers of associations); 10 TEX. REG. 2510, 2512 (Aug. 6,
1985) (proposed rules governing limitations and requirements on loans to directors, officers,
and employees). In addition to the savings and loan regulations, various statutes and regulations governing banks include similar conflicts of interest provisions. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 375,
375a, 375b, 376 (1982 and Supp. 1985) (Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act limits
purchases from and sales to directors, loans to executive officers; prohibits loans and extensions of credit to executive officers and directors; and sets rate of interest paid by directors and
officers); 12 C.F.R. §§ 31-32 (1985) (regulations governing extensions of credit to executive
officers, directors and principal shareholders of national banks); 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.1-.23 (1985)
(Regulation 0, Officer of Comptroller of Currency, regulations regarding loans to insiders and
required disclosures); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1828 () (1982) (FDIC Act limits loans to officers,
directors, and shareholders). Federal law also prohibits certain types of financial arrangements
between national banks and their officers and directors. See 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1982) (Clayton Act
prohibits interlocking directorates among national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 3210 (1982) (Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act prohibits one board of directors controlling more
than one national bank). The following national bank regulations govern or prohibit multipledirectorate activities: 12 C.F.R. § 26 (1985); 12 C.F.R. § 348 (1965); 17 C.F.R. § 250.70
(1985). The above banking regulations should be consulted by the reader when confronted by
a potential conflict of interest in banking activities.
136. See 12 C.F.R. § 571.5 (1984) (Statement of Policy); FHLBB Reg. 83-548, 48 FED.
REG. 45-382 (1983) (explanation of conflicts of interest regulations).
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of an association, (2) legal fees incurred by a lender's attorneys with
respect to residential mortgage loans, and (3) general provisions re137
garding conflicts of interest.
Section 563.33 of the Insurance Regulations limits the number of
attorneys from a single firm eligible to serve as a director of an association. Not more than one director of an FSLIC-insured institution
may be an attorney with a particular firm. 138 All directors are admonished by the FHLBB to avoid conflicts of interest of any139sort so
as not to detract from the trustworthiness of the institution.
With respect to compensation of an association's outside attorneys,
the board of directors of an insured institution has a responsibility to
determine the reasonableness of the fees paid to its outside counsel."'°
Discharge of this responsibility will not be satisfied merely by a determination that the fees paid to counsel are comparable to fees charged
by other attorneys for services rendered to other insured institutions."' Section 563.45 of the Insurance Regulations requires each
insured institution to submit an annual report to the FHLBB disclosing information prescribed in FHLBB Form AR (Annual Report). 42
In the Annual Report, an association must list the amount of direct
renumeration paid by the institution or its subsidiaries for all services
rendered by the association's attorney. 143 A director who is also the
institution's outside counsel must disclose all fees received for legal
services rendered for or on behalf of the institution.'"
The Insurance Regulations prohibit certain tying arrangements.
An insured institution, or service corporation of the institution, is
137. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.33 (1985).

138. See id. § 563.33(a)(1)(iii)(1985). "Firm" is defined in this section to include any
office-sharing arrangements thereby encompassing partnerships and professional corporations.

See id. § 563.33(a)(1). The purpose of this definition is to prevent any form of collusion and to
promote independent boards of directors. See 12 C.F.R. § 571.5 (1984) (Statement of Policy).
139. See FHLBB Memorandum R 62, reprintedin UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS
INSTITUTIONS, UNITED STATES LEAGUE FEDERAL GUIDE

9869, at 2784.3 (1984 ed.)

(memorandum outlining director's obligations and responsibilities).
140. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.33 (a)(l)(iii)(1985).
141. See FHLBB Op. Gen. Counsel (1976), reprinted in UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF
SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, UNITED STATES LEAGUE FEDERAL GUIDE $

(1978 ed.).
142. See id. at

U9-96.14, at 6934-35

U9-96.14 at 6935-36.

143. See FHLBB Memorandum R 42 (1977), reprinted in UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF
SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, UNITED STATES LEAGUE FEDERAL GUIDE

9843,

at 2801.4

(1984

ed.).
144. See id. at

9843, at 2801.4.
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prohibited from granting any loan on the prior condition that the borrower contract with any specific person or organization for legal services rendered to the borrower.14 5 In connection with a residential
mortgage, however, an insured institution may require a borrower to
reimburse the institution for legal services rendered by its attorney, or
to pay directly for such services if, but only if, certain disclosures are
made. First, the attorney's fee must be limited to fees incurred for
processing and closing the loan; second, the fee, if it exceeds $100,
must be accompanied by a statement that (i) describes the legal services rendered, (ii) sets forth the time spent and hourly rate of the attorney, (iii) states that such legal services were performed for the
lender, and (iv) states that the fee is being paid by the borrower.
Third, the attorney's fee must be reasonable and necessary; and finally
the fee must be itemized on the closing statement as a fee paid by the
borrower to lender's attorney. 146 These disclosures may be made in
the form of a Notice Regarding Representation by Lender's Attorney
with a copy of the attorney's statement for services attached as an
exhibit. A form of such notice is included as Appendix A. The
amount of the fee should also be listed on the borrower's closing statement as legal fees paid at closing by borrower to lender's counsel.
All FSLIC-insured savings and loan associations are subject to the
FHLBB's regulations regarding "affiliated party" conflicts of interest.' 4 7 All affiliated party transactions must be disclosed by the institution in its Annual Report to the FHLBB.' 48 These regulations are
complex and should be studied by counsel each time an affiliated
party transaction is contemplated by an association. In some situations, especially those in which various business entities are involved,
it is very helpful to diagram the relationships with the regulation close
at hand to determine whether an affiliated party transaction will result. 4 9 No insured institution, or subsidiary, may directly or indi-

145. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.45 (1985) (Form AR Item 6 (a)).
146. See id. at § 563.45 (1985) (Form AR Item 6 (e)).
147. See FHLBB, Office of General Counsel, Interpretive Letter (Nov. 17, 1976), reprinted in UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, UNITED STATES LEAGUE
FEDERAL GUIDE

U9-96.11, at 6929 (1977 ed.); FHLBB Ops. Gen. Counsel (Dec. 16, 1976),

(Feb. 4, 1977), reprinted in

UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, UNITED

STATES LEAGUE FEDERAL GUIDE

U9-96.14, at 6937-5 (1978 ed.).

148. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.35 (a)(3)(1985).
149. See id. § 563.35 (d). The term "affiliated person" of an insured institution means:
(a) a director, officer or controlling person (meaning a 10% or greater shareholder) of such

institution; (b) a spouse of a director, officer or controlling person; (c) a member of the imme-
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rectly purchase, lease from, jointly own with, sell, or lease to an
affiliated person of the institution any interest in real or personal
property, unless the transaction is determined by the principal supervisory agent of the FHLBB to be fair and in the best interest of the
insured institution or its subsidiary. 5 ° Affiliated party transactions
must comply with the requirements of Section 563.41 of the Insurance
Regulations. First, the institution must obtain prior written approval
for the Section 563.41 transaction from the FHLBB.'51 Second, the
institution must obtain an independent appraisal establishing the
value of the property which is the subject of the transaction. 52 Third,
the transaction must be approved by majority vote of the institution's
board of directors after full disclosure of (i) the affiliated person's
source of financing for the transaction and (ii) the relationship, if any,
between the
insured institution and the entity providing the
13
financing.
With certain exceptions, an insured institution, which includes any
of its subsidiaries, may not make a loan to, or purchase a loan from,
an affiliated person. 54 An exception to this rule is made for loans in
the ordinary course of business of an institution or subsidiary which:
(1) do not involve more than the normal risk of collectibility or which
present other unfavorable features, and (2) do not exceed the loan
amount which would have been available to members of the general
public for a similar loan. 5 The following loans are examples of permissible extensions of credit to affiliated persons: (1) loans secured
by the principal residence of the borrower; (2) loans secured by savings accounts of the borrower at the institution; (3) home improvement loans; (4) overdraft protection; (5) student loans; (6) consumer
loans; and (7) credit cards. 5 6 Mortgage loans or home improvement
diate family of a director, officer or controlling person, who has the same home as such person
or who is a director or officer of any subsidiary or holding company of the institution; (d) any
corporation or organization of which a director, officer or controlling person is chief executive
or chief financial officer, general partner, limited partner with greater than 10% interest in the
limited partnership; and (e) any trust in which a director, officer or controlling person has a

substantial beneficial interest (meaning an interest greater than 10%). See id. § 563.35 (d).
150. See id. §§ 563.41, 563.43.
151. See id. § 563.45.
152. See id. § 561.29.
153. See id. § 563.41 (b).
154. See id. § 563.41.
155. See id. § 563.41.

156. See id. § 563.41 (c).
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loans to an affiliated person, however, must be approved by the institution's board of directors after full disclosure of the interest rate, collateral, and terms of the proposed loan. 157 While such loans may be
made at a favorable rate of interest, generally an association may not
make such a loan at an interest rate less than the institution's cost of
funds.15 Such a loan is justified by the affiliated person's status as a
salaried officer or employee of the institution.1" 9 Extensions of credit
to affiliated persons for commercial purposes may not exceed
$100,000 and require notice to the FHLBB. 1 ° Investments by an insured institution or subsidiary in stocks, bonds, notes or securities of
an affiliated person, or the purchase of securities under a repurchase
" '
agreement with an affiliated person are prohibited.16
In addition to the restrictions on loans and investments involving
affiliated persons, certain transactions with third parties are also prohibited. Prohibited third party transactions include: (i) loans on the
security of real estate purchased from an affiliated person (unless the
property was the affiliated person's principal residence); (ii) loans secured by property in which an affiliated person has a security interest;
157. See id. § 563.43 (b). Texas also has limitations on loans made to persons closely
related to the association. The Texas Savings and Loan Act provides in Section 5.05:
In no event shall an association make a loan, purchase or sell a note or lien or enter into
any participation transaction authorized in Sections 5.01, 5.02, and 5.03 in violation of
any rule or regulation promulgated under Section 5.04 and no association shall:
(1) Make a real estate loan to an officer or director of the association unless such loan
be first approved unanimously by its board of directors and such approval recorded in the
minutes of the meeting of the board at which such loan was approved.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.05 (1) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The Texas Savings
and Loan Department in August, 1985 proposed the following regulations:
(a) An association may make loans authorized by this chapter to any officer, director,
or employee of the association on the following terms:
(1) prior to funding, the loan must be approved by all disinterested members of the
board of directors, with the vote of each director reflected in the minutes, at a duly
constituted meeting; and
(2) the loan shall be at an interest rate not less than the association's cost of funds
and shall be on other terms no more favorable to the borrower than if the borrower
were not an officer, director, or employee of the association.
(b) Prior to funding a loan under this section, an association shall have in its loan file
the documents and records required by § 65.12 of this title (relating to Loan Documentation), as applicable to the type of loan in question.
(c) All such loans shall fully comply with the applicable provisions of this chapter.
10 TEX. REG. 2510, 2512 (Aug. 6, 1985). These proposals have not yet been adopted.
158. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.43 (b) (1985).
159. See id. § 563.43 (b).
160. See id. § 563.43 (b)(2).
161. See id. § 563.43 (b)(3).
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(iii) accepting stocks, bonds or notes of an affiliated person as collateral on a loan to a third party; and (iv) maintaining a compensating
balance or entering into any guarantee or takeout commitment with
respect to a loan by a third party to an affiliated person.162
In most instances, it should be readily apparent to the institution
whether an affiliated person is involved in a loan or investment transaction. As previously discussed, however, in situations involving
loans to corporations, partnerships or limited partnerships, it is always advisable to review the regulation, and when necessary, to diagram the relationships to determine whether an affiliated person is
involved, directly or indirectly, through an entity involved in the
transaction. As a matter of practice on all loans, a lending institution
should always require its borrowers and guarantors to execute at closing a Conflicts of Interest Certificate in which each borrower and
guarantor certifies that the entity or individual is not an affiliated
party. A form of Conflicts of Interest Certificate is included as Appendix B.
B.

Title Insurance

Article 9.30 of the Texas Title Insurance Act prohibits payment of
commissions, rebates, or discounts in connection with issuance of title
insurance policies.' 63 Article 9.30(C), however, provides that the general prohibition against payment of referral fees out of premiums paid
for title policies does not prohibit payment of a fee to an attorney for
legal services actually rendered in connection with issuance of the policy." 6 The State Bar of Texas has opined that this section of the Title
I65
Insurance Act does not result in an ethical conflict of interest.

162. See id. § 563.43 (b).
163. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. .9.30 (Vernon 1981).
164. See id. art. 9.30 (C); see also State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Op. 408 (undated) (relying on DR 2-106 and 5-105 discussing fees for legal services and impairment of attorney's independent professional judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

801:8303 (1985).

165. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9.30 (Vernon 1981); see also State Bar of
Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Op. 408 (undated)
(relying on DR 2-106 and 5-105 discussing fees for legal services and impairment of attorney's
independent professional judgment), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
801:8303 (1985).
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CONCLUSION

Ethical conflicts of interest arise with regularity in a real estate
practice. The ideal solution to a conflict of interest situation is to
decline the representation. However, this is not always a practical
solution. For example, in a small town in which there is only one real
estate lawyer, it may not be practical to refer a client to another lawyer to avoid a conflict. In such a situation, the attorney should fully
disclose the nature of the conflict and obtain the clients' written consents to the representation. In large metropolitan areas on the other
hand, it may be more practical to refer the matter to another lawyer.
The point to be made, in any case, is that the real estate lawyer should
be aware of the rules regarding conflicts of interest and should make
every reasonable effort to avoid conflicts in a manner consistent with
the Canons, Ethical Considerations, Disciplinary Rules, statutes, and
administrative rules discussed in this article. All attorneys who practice in the real estate area should recognize these requirements and
strive to avoid unexpected and unnecessary conflicts of interest.
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APPENDIX A
NOTICE AND STATEMENT REGARDING
LENDER'S ATTORNEYS
The purpose of the following is to fully disclose the relationship
between the law firm of
, hereinafter referred to as "Attorneys", that has, or will prepare the legal documents for this loan transaction for
hereinafter referred to as "Lender".
The undersigned acknowledge that the Attorneys have acted only
as counsel to Lender, and have not, in any manner, undertaken to
assist or render legal advice to the undersigned, with respect to this
transaction. The attorneys preparing the loan documents represent
only Lender, and not any of the other parties involved in this
transaction.
The undersigned understand that they have the right to be represented by their own attorney and to have such other attorney present
at any of the loan transaction meetings.
The undersigned have been provided with an opportunity to examine the title commitment issued by the title company in this transaction, and are satisfied with the contents of said commitment.
Further, the undersigned agree and understand that this transaction is
not "closed" until the Lender issues its funds and until all disbursements are made on behalf of all parties. In the event there are any
additional charges by anyone furnishing services, requiring payoff, or
by any taxing authority, the undersigned will pay same upon written
request.
The undersigned acknowledge Borrower's obligation as a part of
Borrower's agreement with Lender, to pay the legal fees of Attorneys.
If this transaction involves a sale of property, the undersigned understand that the parties may allocate payment of the legal fees between
themselves as they may agree.
The undersigned acknowledge that they have been notified and understand their right to independent legal counsel and that the Attorneys represent only the interest of Lender, and not those of any of the
other parties.
Dated to be effective the
day of
, 1985.
BORROWER
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GUARANTOR
THE STATE OF
§
COUNTY OF
§
This instrument was acknowledged before me on the
,1985, by

- day of

-

Notary Public, State of
My commission expires:
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APPENDIX B
CONFLICT OF INTEREST CERTIFICATE

RE: $

Loan (the "Loan") from
("Lender") to
("Borrower")
The undersigned is the applicant for and will become the obligor on
the Loan and hereby certifies to Lender that:
Borrower is not acting as trustee for any officer, director or stockholder of Lender or any affiliate of Lender and no officer, director, or
stockholder of Lender or any affiliate of Lender is an officer, director,
stockholder or partner of Borrower.
Borrower acknowledges Lender's intended reliance upon this certificate in making the Loan to Borrower.
Executed this - day of
, 1985.
BORROWER
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